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Property Rights and Job Security:
Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee
Union Organizers
The right of self-organization granted employees by section 71 of the
National Labor Relations Act2 includes a right to engage in workplace
union solicitation. This activity may be limited only by the employer's
managerial needs.' Indeed, employees' solicitation right is considered so
essential to self-organization that they may not waive it in a collective
bargaining agreement.4 Yet the Supreme Court, while recognizing the im-
portance of contact between employees and union organizers for informed
exercise of the right of self-organization,5 has long insisted upon separate
analyses of solicitation by employee and nonemployee union organizers,
and has restricted solicitation by recognizing an employer property right
only in the latter context.
This Note challenges the rationale underlying the doctrinal distinction
between employee and nonemployee solicitation. It argues further that the
nonemployee solicitation doctrine fails adequately to value employee job
security, by allowing a trivial employer property claim to undermine em-
ployees' statutory right to advance their interests through self-
organization. In this respect, the nonemployee solicitation doctrine limits
the reach of an emerging balance between enhanced employee job security
and limited employer property rights reflected in both the administration
of the NLRA and the erosion of the doctrine of employment at will.
I. THE EMPLOYEE AND NONEMPLOYEE SOLICITATION DOCTRINES
Employees' workplace solicitation right derives from the section 7 right
of self-organization, which established collective bargaining as the pri-
mary legal means by which employees may protect their employment in-
terests. Job security is clearly a major, if not the principal, interest that
employees seek to advance through self-organization. Accordingly, virtu-
ally all collective bargaining agreements abrogate the employer's discre-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) provides that: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." Employer actions held unreasonably
to interfere with activities protected by § 7 violate § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) [hereinafter "the Act" or "the NLRA"].
3. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 & n.10 (1945).
4. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 324-25 (1974).
5. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
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tionary power to discipline or discharge employees-a power traditionally
considered incident to the employer's property right'-and impose a 'just
cause" standard which limits the employer to actions motivated by legiti-
mate managerial concei'ns.7 Collective bargaining further contributes to
job security by standardizing promotions, transfers, and layoffs on the ba-
sis of seniority.8
The Court has interpreted the NLRA to protect union solicitation in
order to ensure that employees are able to make an informed choice re-
garding self-organization. Informed employee choice requires workplace
contact between employees and nonemployee organizers. The nonem-
ployee solicitation doctrine thus severely impedes self-organization, sacri-
ficing employee job security to an employer property claim that is obsolete
and trivial in comparison with the power of dismissal.
A. Republic Aviation
The facts of the two cases joined in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,9
in which the Court found that section 7 guarantees employees the right to
engage in union solicitation on company property, strongly supported a
broad policy governing workplace solicitation by employees. In each case,
employees were discharged for engaging in union solicitation on company
property on their own time, in violation of a company rule against solici-
tation. Both companies had adopted their rules prior to union activity at
the plant, and the rules prohibited all types of solicitation. Further, the
employees could not claim that the location of the plants made solicitation
off company property impossible.10
In sustaining Board orders requiring reinstatement or compensation of
the discharged employees, the Court recognized that, because the work-
place is a uniquely appropriate site to discuss unionization, freedom of
association at the workplace is essential to safeguard the right of self-
organization."" The Court accepted the Board's premise that only mana-
6. See infra p. 389.
7. Eighty-three percent of collective bargaining agreements limit discharges by the inclusion of
"cause" or "just cause" provisions, 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS
(BNA) § 40:1 (1979), and even where such explicit provisions are absent, "arbitrators read them into
the contract as necessarily implied from seniority clauses or grievance and arbitration provisions,"
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481,
499-500 (1976). Under such a standard, the employer must justify discharges on the basis of
managerial imperatives.
8. Eighty-nine percent of collective bargaining agreements contain seniority provisions. 2 CoLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 75:1 (1983).
9. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
10. Id. at 794-99.
11. Id. at 801 n.6. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (workplace is
"uniquely appropriate" for discussion of self-organization).
More recently, the Court has clearly indicated that employees' solicitation right guarantees not
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gerial, not property, rights should be considered in evaluating prohibitions
of employee solicitation at the workplace,12 and adopted the twin pre-
sumptions regarding solicitation rules that followed from this premise:
"[A] rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours ...
must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that it was
adopted for a discriminatory purpose ... [but] a rule prohibiting
union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although
on company property ... must be presumed to be an unreasonable
impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the
absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule neces-
sary in order to maintain production or discipline."13
Thus the workplace solicitation right established in Republic Aviation
is premised upon a distinction between the absolute right of an employer
to deny use of company property for union solicitation, which has been
abrogated by the NLRA, and the managerial right to impose reasonable
limitations on such solicitation in the interest of productivity, which the
employer retains under the NLRA. Protection of employee job security
rests on the same distinction between the property and the managerial
rights of the employer. Job security is achieved through abrogation of the
employer's property right of absolute control over job tenure," either as a
result of unionization and the imposition of a just cause requirement for
dismissal in a collective bargaining agreement 5 or through the creation of
legislative or judicial exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will.'8
The employer is thus limited to a managerial right of dismissal in the
interest of production or discipline, the very right that Republic Aviation
protects in the union solicitation context.1
7
merely some, but effective, workplace communication. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
491 (1978) (employees' § 7 right to organize and bargain collectively "necessarily encompasses the
right effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite").
12. 324 U.S. at 797-98. The Court characterized the issue presented by Republic Aviation as the
propriety of the Board's "adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization ... and the
equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments."
The Court explicitly adopted the Board's policy of limiting the employer's ability to promulgate no-
solicitation rules to managerial interests in Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10. This policy held
that although rules forbidding workplace solicitation were valid if needed to avoid disruption of pro-
duction, Denver Tent & Awning Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 586, 588 (1943), a rule prohibiting employee
solicitation on company time outside of working hours would be presumed invalid absent "special
circumstances" demonstrating that the rule was "necessary ... for the sake of efficiency, discipline, or
production." Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 844 (1943).
13. 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943)).
14. This right is protected by the doctrine of employment at will. See infra p. 389.
15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. See infra pp. 390-92.
17. Although the Court decisively adopted Board presumptions regarding employee solicitation in
Republic Aviation, its rationale remained ambiguous: Was the employer's property right to deny
workplace solicitation entirely displaced by employees' § 7 right of self-organization, or only displaced
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The Republic Aviation presumptions are well settled18 and strictly en-
forced. They place a heavy burden on the employer who seeks to demon-
strate that special circumstances relating to production or discipline justify
a rule against nonworking time employee solicitation,19 and render invalid
overbroad rules that might silence protected solicitation.2" Facially legiti-
mate solicitation rules that companies adopt or enforce so as to discrimi-
nate against union solicitation are also invalid.2 Nevertheless, strict en-
forcement of employee solicitation rights has not come at the expense of
managerial flexibility. In the context of retail facilities, for example, the
Board interprets Republic Aviation as authorizing employers to prevent
disruption of their businesses by barring employee solicitation in selling
areas during both working and nonworking time."
in the context of workplace solicitation by employees? This ambiguous treatment of employer prop-
erty rights did not affect application of the Republic Aviation presumptions to employee solicitation; it
is implicated, however, in the Court's subsequent formulation of a nonemployee solicitation doctrine
and will be discussed in that context, see infra pp. 378-80.
18. Company rules regarding employee workplace solicitation and distribution of literature are
now evaluated under standards adopted by the Board in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615
(1962), pursuant to Republic Aviation. The standards accord presumptive validity to rules forbidding
employee distribution of union literature in work areas during either working or nonworking time
and to rules forbidding employee solicitation during working time in any plant area; they hold pre-
sumptively invalid rules forbidding the distribution of union literature in nonwork areas during non-
working time and rules forbidding union solicitation during nonworking time. Jarvis, Organizational
Campaigns: Private Rights vs. Public Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVFRSITY
TwENrY-SixTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3, 4 (1974).
Courts in all circuits acknowledge the continued validity of the Republic Aviation presumptions.
See Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Miller, 341
F.2d 870, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1965); Graham Architectural Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534,
541-42 (3d Cir. 1983); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1983);
Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1983); Union Carbide Corp. v.
NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1983); Midwest Stock Exch. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255, 1270
(7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Chem Fab Corp., 691 F.2d 1252, 1258 (8th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Silver
Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 582 (9th Cir. 1980); Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283,
1286 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Lummus Indus., 679 F.2d 229, 233 (11th Cir. 1982); Road Sprink-
ler Fitters v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. John Cuneo, Inc. v.
NLRB, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983).
19. See Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1980) (employer's "mere
assertion" that special circumstances exist insufficient to justify curtailment of employee's guaranteed
rights).
20. See, e.g., Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1971) (rule prohibiting
solicitation absent prior approval by personnel department invalid, though unenforced, because of
chilling effect on protected solicitation); NLRB v. Linda Jo Shoe Co., 307 F.2d 355, 357 (5th Cir.
1962) (posted rule absolutely prohibiting solicitation on company premises invalid despite employer's
statement that rule applied to worktime solicitation only).
21. See Revere Camera Co. v. NLRB, 304 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1962) (facially valid no-
solicitation rule adopted after start of union campaign and enforced only against pro-union solicitation
held invalid).
22. See McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404, 407-08 (1973) (upholding rule forbidding em-
ployee solicitation in selling area of retail food outlet). The origin of this policy is the Board's decision
in May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 (1944), enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946). The exception applies to any "retail business where customers deal
directly with the employees," Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1271 (1948) (upholding rule forbid-
ding employee solicitation on selling floor of department store restaurant open to both public and
employees).
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B. Babcock
Despite the strong policy in support of broad solicitation rights estab-
lished by Republic Aviation and its progeny, the Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,23 refused to apply the Republic Aviation
presumptions to workplace solicitation by nonemployee organizers.24
Under the Babcock formula, companies may deny nonemployee union or-
ganizers the most effective means of communication-workplace solicita-
tion 2-"if reasonable efforts by the union through other available chan-
nels of communication will enable ... [it] to reach the employees with...
[its] message."26
The nonemployee access challenged in the cases joined in Babcock had
not extended beyond company parking lots. The employers did not claim
that such access threatened plant management; rather, in the absence of
managerial concerns, they claimed a property right to deny access to non-
employees. Disposition of this claim turned on the rationale underlying
Republic Aviation. Prior to Babcock, the NLRB had adopted a policy of
applying Republic Aviation's twin presumptions to workplace solicitation
by employees and nonemployees alike. The Board implicitly interpreted
the opinion to hold that the NLRA had entirely displaced employers'
property right to control access whenever such access is sought for pur-
poses of union solicitation-limiting the employer to a managerial interest
in regulating the extent of workplace solicitation.
In supporting the employers' claim, the Babcock Court repudiated the
Board's interpretation of Republic Aviation. The Court discovered a dis-
tinction "of substance"27 between solicitation by employees and nonem-
ployees: Employers owe no obligation to nonemployee organizers under
the Act.2" Thus Babcock held that recognition of an employer property
right to deny access to company property for union solicitation turns on
whether those engaged in the solicitation possess section 7 rights. 9
What the Court failed to recognize was that while nonemployee union
organizers do not possess section 7 rights, they are employees' principal
23. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
24. Id. at 113. Prior to the Court's decision in Babcock, the Board had applied the Republic
Aviation presumptions to rules governing solicitation by employees and nonemployees alike. See Han-
ley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266,
295 (1958).
25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574
(1978) (workplace is particularly appropriate location for distribution of union literature); cf. Gould,
Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505,
513 (1965) (workplace is "focal point" of organizational effort because of inherent difficulties in use
of other meeting places).
26. 351 U.S. at 112.
27. Id. at 113.
28. Id. at 113-14.
29. Id.
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source of pro-union information during a representation campaign. Thus
the question presented in Babcock was not whether nonemployees had a
right to engage in workplace solicitation, but whether employees' section 7
right of self-organization encompassed a right to workplace contact with
nonemployee organizers. Moreover, the NLRB had long ago decided that
section 7 grants employees the right not only to speak but "to receive aid,
advice, and information from others" concerning self-organization.30
While the Babcock Court recognized that informed employee choice de-
pends upon communication with professional organizers,31 it assumed that
the right of self-organization could in most cases be adequately protected
by contact off company property."2 This failure to appreciate the impor-
tance of contact at the workplace between union organizers and employees
and the inadequacy of alternative means of communication33 prevented
the Court from concluding, with the Board, that employees' solicitation
right necessitated abridgement of the property right to deny access to non-
employee organizers. 4
The Court has recently offered a new rationale for Babcock's distinction
between employee and nonemployee solicitation, stating that the property
claim was upheld in Babcock because it was asserted against trespassers,
rather than against employees who had been invited onto company prop-
erty by the employer.3 5 The Court has thus come to view Babcock as rest-
ing on a distinction in status between employees and nonemployees, not as
possessors or nonpossessors of section 7 rights, but as invitees or trespass-
ers against whom the employer retains a property right of exclusion.3"
The texts of Republic Aviation and Babcock do not support this formu-
lation of the distinction between employee and nonemployee solicitation.3"
30. Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938).
31. 351 U.S. at 113.
32. Id. at 112-13.
33. See Note, Still as Strangers: Nonenployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Property,
62 TEx. L. REv. 111, 151-52 (1983) (Babcock Court erroneously assumed efficacy of alternative
channels of communication).
34. Cf Bredhoff, Forum: Labor Law Reform: A Labor Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REv. 27, 32 (1978)
("IT]he thirty year history of litigation concerning rights of access for employees and organizers
reveals that the limitations on those rights have stemmed not from the requirements of the Act, but
from unfounded assumptions as to the effectiveness of alternative channels of communication.").
35. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
36. In Eastex the Court stated:
The difference was that the nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought to trespass on the
employer's property, whereas the employees in Republic Aviation did not .... The Court
recently has emphasized the distinction between the two cases: "A wholly different balance was
struck when the organizational activity was carried on by employees already rightfully on the
employer's property, since the employer's management interests rather than his property inter-
ests were there involved."
437 U.S. at 571-72 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 n.10 (1976)).
37. It appears, however, that the author of both Republic Aviation and Babcock, Justice Reed,
may have had this distinction in mind. Compare the Court's interpretation of Republic Aviation in
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Nor does an invitee-trespasser distinction make sense given the nature of
the employer's claim. The employer is asserting a property right to con-
trol not merely access to, but more importantly use of, company property.
Both employee and nonemployee solicitation threaten this property right.
The artificial invitee-trespasser distinction thus veils the fact that, from
the point of view of the employer, all workplace solicitation is trespass.38
The invitee-trespasser distinction is equally incoherent with respect to
the Court's holding in Republic Aviation. Had the Court thought that the
employer's invitation to employees included a waiver of the right to pro-
hibit workplace solicitation, it could simply have dismissed the employers'
claims on that basis; the creation of an employee right of self-organization
in the NLRA would not have been decisive. 39 Rather than so holding, the
Court determined that employees' right of self-organization abridged the
employer's property right to deny use of the workplace for union
solicitation.
Republic Aviation does, however, recognize an employer's managerial
right to regulate solicitation in the interest of discipline, production, or
safety. As applied to solicitation by nonemployee organizers, Republic
Aviation would authorize denial of access in circumstances where access
truly posed a threat of disruption to the employer's business. The argu-
ment that Babcock rests on an invitee-trespasser distinction is thus reduced
to the implausible assertion that control over access to company premises,
in the absence of concern over disruption or safety, is not only a more
important property right than control over use of the premises, but is
more important than employees' section 7 rights.40
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (owner's property right was circumscribed by statutory
grant of right of self-organization to employees) with Justice Reed's dissent in the same case, id. at
515 (recognition of statutory right in Republic Aviation was dependent upon employees' status as
licensees).
38. Justice Rehnquist makes this point in his dissent in Eastex, 437 U.S. at 581-82 n.1. Indeed
the Court has made this very point in another context. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
564-65 (1972) (shopping mall owner's invitation to public is limited to owner's commercial purpose).
39. Cf Note, supra note 33, at 163-64 (employees had no more right to workplace solicitation at
common law than nonemployees).
40. The view that Babcock rests on an invitee-trespasser distinction has led to a limitation of the
solicitation rights of off-duty employees, whose activity, absent this reformulation of Babcock, would
have been protected by Republic Aviation. Courts adopting the invitee-trespasser distinction have held
that since off-duty employees are no longer invitees, they and nonemployees are similarly situated. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1973); Diamond Shamrock Co. v.
NLRB, 443 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 1971); Jarvis, supra note 18, at 12. The courts' position forced the
Board to reverse its earlier view that Republic Aviation governed off-duty employee solicitation and to
hold that Babcock's alternative channels of communication standard would apply. GTE Lenkurt, Inc.,
204 N.L.R.B. 921, 921-22 (1973).
The Board has since acknowledged that application of the invitee-trespasser distinction forces work-
place solicitation among employees-the very activity protected by Republic Aviation-to yield to an
employer property claim merely because the employees work separate shifts, and has adopted a com-
promise position under which a rule forbidding access by off-duty employees is valid "only if it ...
limits access solely with respect to the interior of the plant and other working areas... ." Tri-County
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C. The Babcock Doctrine Applied
Babcock's protection of employer property rights in the context of non-
employee solicitation seriously compromises the right of access to informa-
tion granted employees in Republic Aviation.41 Broad application of Bab-
cock's alternative channels of communication test, designed to protect
employers' property rights, has undermined employees' section 7 right to
protect their jobs via self-organization. Use of the test has sharply cur-
tailed employees' communication with nonemployee organizers, the criti-
cal source of pro-union information during a representation campaign,
and granted employers the exclusive right to make speeches to the captive
audience of employees at the workplace.42
The doctrine developed under Babcock rests on a nearly irrebuttable
presumption against nonemployee access to company property.43 This
Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089 (1976). Rules forbidding off-duty employee access to
outside, nonworking areas such as parking lots or gates are invalid unless "justified by business rea-
sons." Id.
This compromise makes little sense as a matter of doctrine and offers inadequate protection of
separate-shift employee solicitation. If the policy is designed to protect managerial rather than prop-
erty interests of the employer, there is no reason to deny off-duty employees (or nonemployees) the
right to solicit in interior plant areas on the same terms-under Republic Aviation-as employees
who are on duty. Alternatively, if the critical boundary of the protected employer property interest is
thought to be the plant wall, there is no reason not to permit nonemployee solicitation on parking lots
and at gates as well. Furthermore, the Board's compromise may permit distribution of union litera-
ture by off-duty employees to those working different shifts (as the latter arrive for or leave work) but
will not permit adequate discussion of self-organization between such groups of employees for, as the
Court and the Board have recognized, see supra note 11, such discussion occurs within the plant
during rest periods.
41. See Zimny, Access of Union Organizers to "Private" Property, 25 LAB. L.J. 618, 624 (1974):
Realization of [the right of self-organization] requires a maximum opportunity for effective
communication with employees. But to elevate property rights over the personal rights guaran-
teed by the Act, as the Board and the Courts have largely done in their repeated denial of the
right of nonemployee organizers to effectively communicate with workers, frustrates fulfillment
of federal law in the most basic way.
Empirical support for this proposition is discussed infra note 48.
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357 (1958), Chief Justice
Warren asserted that, because of the importance of use of the workplace for organization, denial of
access to the union by an employer engaged in coercive campaigning would itself constitute an unfair
labor practice. Id. at 368-69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); cf. Barron, A
Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REv. 421, 439 (1981) (arguing that decision to recog-
nize a property claim as against nonemployee solicitation "effectively... created] an employer right
that the NLRA arguably had extinguished").
42. Several commentators argue that Babcock has resulted in an erosion of the employee solicita-
tion right. See Bredhoff, supra note 34, at 27-28; Gould, supra note 25, at 512; Zimny, supra note
41, at 619-20, 624.
43. Despite the Court's assertion in Babcock that "[aiccommodation between [§ 7 and property
rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other," 351 U.S. at 112, its holding that an employer may exclude nonemployee organizers where
alternative means of contacting employees exist, id., established a clear presumption in favor of the
employer and placed a heavy burden on the union to justify displacement of the property right. See
Note, NLRB Orders Granting Unions Access to Company Property, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 902
(1983) ("[A]lmost any degree of contact establishes the existence of alternative means of access.").
The Court has recently resurrected Babcock's principle of accommodation in the context of strike
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presumption results from the courts' broad application of Babcock, which
deems "reasonable" alternative channels of communication available to
the union, such as home visits, correspondence, and advertising cam-
paigns, in all but exceptional cases."" In 1975, Board Member Fanning,
reviewing the application of the Babcock standard, concluded that
"[g]enerally speaking, an employer... can prohibit union solicitation or
distribution by non-employees at any time and anywhere on his
property."
'4 5
Babcock's presumption against union access enables employers to create
an informational imbalance in their favor by using the most effective fo-
rum for solicitation, the workplace, to deliver "captive audience" speeches
without giving union organizers a similar opportunity.46 In this way, re-
activity on quasi-public property (such as shopping malls or office buildings), suggesting that proper
accommodation in a given case depends upon the nature of the § 7 activity at issue. Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976).
The result of flexible application of Babcock in the context of nonorganizational § 7 activity is that,
because of the traditional strict application of Babcock's presumption against access for purposes of
solicitation, see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text, the Board may now grant access to quasi-
public property more freely for strike activity than for organizational solicitation. Compare Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (owner of office building violates
§ 8(a)(1) by threatening to arrest both employees and nonemployees picketing, in support of strike, in
foyer of restaurant on forty-sixth floor) with Hutzler Bros. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 1012, 1016-18 (4th
Cir. 1980) (operator of department store does not violate § 8(a)(1) by threatening to arrest nonem-
ployee organizers engaged in solicitation at store entrances, in absence of showing that union had no
other reasonable means of communicating with employees). Cf O'Connor, Accominodating Labor's
Section 7 Rights to Picket, Solicit, and Distribute Literature on Quasi-Public Property with the Own-
ers' Property Rights, 32 MERCER L. REV. 769, 789 (1981) (despite flexibility in accommodating § 7
and property rights authorized in Hudgens, if protected activity at issue is organizational solicitation
"the test as stated in Babcock & Wilcox is still controlling"). This result cannot be justified as protect-
ing either important § 7 or property rights, for it is the policy of the Act to prevent strike activity (at
issue in Hudgens), through collective bargaining (see United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)), while solicitation is necessary to enable employees to
exercise the right of self-organization, which is the centerpiece of federal labor policy.
44. Zimny, supra note 41, at 620-21. Exceptions are exceedingly rare. Note, supra note 43, at
902. See Husky Oil v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643, 647-48 (10th Cir. 1982) (remote Alaskan worksite;
Board access order enforced).
While the Board has been more lenient in the context of resorts with live-in employees, the courts
typically have denied enforcement of access orders in such cases because the union could not demon-
strate the impossibility of using alternative means to establish contact with the employees. See NLRB
v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972); NLRB v.
Kutsher's Hotel & Country Club, 427 F.2d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 1970). Note, supra note 43, at 903.
45. Fanning, Union Solicitation and Distribution of Literature on the Job-Balancing the Rights
of Employers and Employees, 9 GA. L. REv. 367, 371 (1975). The Court has also acknowledged that
"the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock accommodation principle has
rarely been in favor of trespassory organizational activity." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978).
46. This rule was established by the Board in Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409
(1953). Its impact on representation campaigns is suggested infra note 48.
The employer may deliver a captive audience speech under circumstances that violate a company
rule against solicitation, yet invoke Babcock to deny the union access. NLRB v. United Steelworkers
of America (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1958) (enforcement of otherwise valid rules prohib-
iting employee solicitation by employers who engaged in workplace anti-union solicitation does not
constitute unfair labor practice absent showing that "the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the
ability of the labor organizations involved to carry their messages to the employees").
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stricting employee access to pro-union information on company premises
during a representation campaign undermines the statutory goal of in-
formed employee choice.
The only empirical study of representation campaigns to date47 con-
firms that employer monopolization of the workplace as a location for
campaign meetings is critical to employers' success in defeating employee
self-organization.48 Given employers' increased advantage over unions in
exposing employees to their campaigns, and increasingly sophisticated em-
ployer campaign tactics, it is hardly surprising that the proportion of elec-
tions won by unions has steadily declined since the Court's decision in
Babcock.49
The NLRB has authority to grant limited union access to company bulletin boards or parking lots
when the employer commits unfair labor practices during the campaign. Such remedial orders, how-
ever, are uncommon and are typically enforced only upon substantial evidence of extreme or repeated
abuses by the employer. Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 888-89 (6th Cir.
1969) (order granting limited access to parking lots and bulletin boards enforced where employer
prevented union distribution of literature on adjacent public property, kept employees under surveil-
lance and photographed those taking union literature, forced organizers' cars off highway, and
threatened organizers with physical injury), see also Textile Workers Union v. NLRB (J.P. Stevens),
388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 620
F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1980).
47. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW &
REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS].
48. Employees reported roughly equivalent exposure to company and union written campaign
material, id. at 90, while neither management representatives nor pro-union employees engaged in
extensive personal solicitation at work. Id. at 93-94. Union organizers reported a disinclination to use
home visits as an organizing tactic because of geographical dispersion and the difficulty of competing
with other activities of the employees. Id. at 94-95. The meeting emerged as the means of communi-
cation that correlated most directly with employee familiarity with a party's campaign. Id. at 91,
95-96. Campaign familiarity, in turn, correlated with a pro-union vote: While company and union
voters tended to be equally familiar with the employer's campaign, union voters were "significantly
more familiar with the union's campaign than were company voters." Id. at 85. This contrast ap-
peared most significantly with respect to employees who switched their vote as a result of the cam-
paign. Id. at 103-04. The authors comment that "[t]he apparent reason why the switchers and the
undecided who voted union knew significantly more about the union campaign was that they attended
union meetings more frequently," id. at 104, and conclude:
The employer's advantage is primarily due to the powerful correlation between campaign
familiarity and attendance at meetings .... The employer tends to be far more successful in
attracting employees to meetings on working time and premises than does the union in at-
tracting them to meetings outside working hours and away from company premises. Eighty-
three percent of the sample attended company meetings, while only 36 percent attended union
meetings. Furthermore, those employees who attended union meetings tended to be union sup-
porters. The company, then, has a great advantage in communicating with the undecided and
those not already committed to it. This advantage is particularly important since attendance at
union meetings is significantly related to switching to the union.
Id. at 156-57. Cf Bredhoff, supra note 34, at 32-33 (combination of Babcock doctrine and captive
audience speech creates "unjustifiable imbalance" favoring employer's campaign).
49. The union victory rate fell from 74% in 1950 to 61% in 1965 and 48% in 1980. Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769, 1775-76 (1983). The result was a decline in the proportion of organized nonagricultural
workers from nearly 35% in 1954 to just over 20% in 1980. Id. at 1771-72. Weiler rejects the claim
that declining employee enthusiasm for unionism is responsible for this trend and, like the authors of
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, supra note 47, argues that it is the result of Board administra-
tion of representation campaigns. Weiler, supra, at 1773-74 & n.6, 1776-77. Weiler's concern, how-
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II. JOB SECURITY UNDER THE NLRA
By denying employees meaningful contact with the principal source of
pro-union information, Babcock severely burdens employees' right to seek
job security through self-organization. The current assault on employers'
property right to discharge unorganized employees at will, discussed in
Part III, rests on a contemporary recognition of the need to reverse Bab-
cock's priorities, and to protect job security by prohibiting the employer
from acting in the absence of a legitimate managerial concern. Babcock
also runs counter to the policy of enhancing the job security of unionized
employees reflected in limitations imposed on employer speech and union
organizational rights in the administration of the NLRA.
A. Employer Speech Rights
Despite the Supreme Court's repeated assertions that the First Amend-
ment protects full and open debate,50 it has enforced restrictions on em-
ever, is not union access to employees during the campaign, but coercive employer campaign tactics. In
opposition to the conclusions in UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, see infra note 55, Weiler iden-
tifies employers' coercive tactics as the primary obstacle to employee self-organization. Weiler, supra,
at 1772-74, 1776-77, 1781. Whether the cause of declining employee unionization is employer coer-
cion, employer promises of concessions, fear of job loss, or changed economic and political attitudes, it
is reasonable to assume that workplace contact between union organizers and employees and redress
of the imbalance favoring access to the employer's campaign would counteract these influences and
strengthen pro-union sentiment.
Labor leaders' opposition to the Babcock doctrine led to the inclusion of an equal access provision in
the proposals to amend the Act considered during the 95th Congress, see H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. REc. 32482-83 (1977); S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 4, 124 CONG. REC.
13812 (1978); the House bill passed, but the Senate bill did not. It is unclear to what extent the equal
access rule blocked Senate passage of the labor law reform bill. In a post-defeat debate of the equal
access issue, however, the management spokesman suggested that the bills were perceived as unfair
because while they urged the equal access rule on the basis of UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS,
supra note 47, see infra note 91, the bills failed to include the authors' companion recommendation
that the Board deregulate employer campaign activity. Kramer, Forum: Labor Law Reform: A Man-
agement Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REv. 4, 9 (1978).
50. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (corporate identity of speaker
is impermissible basis for regulation of speech that limits public's access to information essential for
democratic decisionmaking); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (First
Amendment protects public right to "uninhibited marketplace of ideas" against monopolization by
broadcasters); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (First Amendment em-
braces "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open"); cf Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of
Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court's departure from general
First Amendment standards in labor context); Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 243, 246 (1963) (increased regulation of speech under
NLRA threatens constitutional rights of the regulated).
Outside of the labor context, the Court generally refuses to assume that speech will have a coercive
impact. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 836, 915-20 (1982); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). Getman, supra, at 10, contrasts the Court's rejection of
government officials' claims to be able to predict the impact of speech on listeners, e.g., Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24 & n.5 (1971), and its insistence that speech not be characterized as
unlawful absent clear threats of imminent violence, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969),
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ployer speech during union representation campaigns. These restrictions
are imposed by the Board in an effort to prevent coercion from undermin-
ing employee efforts to organize. Section 8(c) of the Act 1 theoretically
incorporated First Amendment protection for employer campaign activity
by limiting the range of expression that could be considered an unfair
labor practice to "threat[s] of reprisal or force or promise[s] of benefit."
However, the standard developed under this provision treats the prohibi-
tion expansively. Employer remarks concerning the effect of unionization
will be considered unprotected threats unless they are "carefully phrased
on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demon-
strably probable consequences beyond his control."52 Should the union
lose, such threats subject the employer to a rerun election or a bargaining
order.51 Moreover, merely conferring economic benefits on employees dur-
ing a campaign may subject the employer to similar consequences.5 4
These restrictions on employer speech are particularly striking given
the lack of a proven correlation between unlawful employer campaign tac-
tics and employee voting behavior. 55 In curtailing employer First Amend-
ment rights on the basis of a speculative notion of coercion, the Court
places great value on employees' right to seek job protection through self-
organization. Yet Babcock seriously compromises this right on behalf of a
trivial employer property right. Because it permits employers to control
merely access to, but not use of, company property, the nonemployee solic-
itation doctrine in fact serves little purpose other than that of frustrating
employee self-organization.5
B. Union Organizational Rights
The NLRA does more to protect employee job security than merely
regulate representation campaigns. By organizing, employees effectively
abrogate the employer's property right of absolute control over job tenure.
Their collective bargaining agreement protects them against discipline or
discharge for other than legitimate managerial reasons, and replaces em-
with the ready assumption of coercive impact in the labor speech context.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
52. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
53. Id. at 614-15.
54. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
55. The authors of UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, supra note 47, concluded on the basis
of their research that unlawful employer campaign tactics had no effect on employee voting, giving
rise to a continuing debate discussed, most recently, in Weiler, supra note 49, at 1782 & n.39. Wei-
ler's claim that the declining union victory rate is due primarily to coercive employer campaign tactics,
id. at 1781, relies on analysis of the data reported in UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, id. at
1784 n.50, by W. Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
56. Cf. Note, supra note 33, at 167-71 (Babcock protects "purely dignitary property interest that
cannot be justified as providing efficiency, liberty, or personal identity").
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ployer discretion concerning promotions and transfers with a seniority sys-
tem. In the administration of this agreement, however, conflicts may arise
between an individual employee's job security interests and the rights of
the union. While resolution of such conflicts in favor of the individual
could conceivably interfere with the job security of employees as a group,
courts have preferred to promote employee job security at the expense of
union rights in each of the following contexts.
1. Union Speech
Employee challenges to certain expenditures of dues by certified bar-
gaining agents have led courts. to impose a heavy burden on union politi-
cal speech. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,57 the Court held that
a union violated the First Amendment rights of employees by spending a
portion of the dues it had collected pursuant to an agency shop agreement
for political contributions to which the employees objected and which the
Court found to be unrelated to the union's statutory duties as collective
bargaining agent. 58 The decision does more than protect First Amendment
rights of employees. By holding that an employee must not be forced to
choose between speech rights and continued employment, 59 Abood ac-
knowledges the value of and protects employee job security,60 despite the
serious cost to the union."1
2. Union Membership Requirements
The Board has enhanced employee job security by interpreting the
NLRA to protect union members against discipline or discharge by the
employer at the union's insistence for violation of any union membership
requirement other than payment of dues.62 This policy affords employees
the greatest degree of job security consistent with protection of the union's
financial base. It clearly burdens the union's ability effectively to enforce
57. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
58. Id. at 235-36.
59. Id. at 235: "[First Amendment principles] prohibit the appellees from requiring any of the
appellants to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of holding
a job as a public school teacher."
60. The weight that the Court gave to employee job security in limiting union speech is illustrated
by the contrast between Abood and the Court's decision the following year in First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), wherein the Court refused to uphold limitations on corporate speech on
the basis of an asserted state interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of dissenting share-
holders. Id. at 792-95.
61. The Court admitted that "difficult problems" would attend the "drawing [of] lines between
collective bargaining activities . . . and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining." 431
U.S. at 236. In fact, the traditional inseparability of union political and economic activities makes the
Abood rule a fertile source of litigation for anti-union employees and, therefore, an onerous and ex-
pensive liability for unions.
62. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954).
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its membership requirements, in the interest of protecting employee job
security.
3. Duty of Fair Representation
The most extensive burdening of union associational freedom in the in-
terest of employee job security has come with the expansion of unions'
duty of fair representation. 3 This duty, originally a protection of unit
members excluded from membership against invidious discrimination by
the union,6 has expanded into a broad and ill-defined responsibility that
a union nonarbitrarily represent the interests of all unit members during
contract administration. 5 At least one lower court has interpreted the Su-
preme Court's admonition that a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion"6 as trans-
forming the duty into a prohibition of mere negligent union representa-
tion.6 7 Such a prohibition imposes serious constraints upon the union's
freedom to structure its system of grievance management, in order to pro-
tect employee job security. It seeks to prevent union mismanagement of
the grievance of an improperly disciplined or discharged employee from
causing the individual's contract claim against the employer to lapse.
In the regulation of representation elections and contract administration
under the NLRA, the Board and the courts place great importance on job
security, and are willing to burden competing rights of unions and em-
ployers. Continued recognition of a near-absolute employer property right
to deny access to union organizers is a particularly costly exception to this
commitment to the protection of job security in representation campaigns
and contract administration. It frustrates informed employee choice re-
garding unionization, thus impeding efforts to gain job security through
the means provided by the NLRA.
III. JOB SECURITY AND EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The protection of unionized employees discussed in Part II mirrors a
growing appreciation in scholarship 8 and caselaw of the importance of
63. The origin of this duty is the Court's opinion in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944), holding that a union may not use its status as bargaining agent to discrimi-
nate against black employees in contract negotiation.
64. The Steele Court analogized the union's duty to that of a legislature "to give equal protection
to the interests of those for whom it legislates." Id. at 202.
65. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
66. Id. at 191.
67. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975) (failure of union
official to file arbitration papers on time violates duty of fair representation). For a discussion of the
current standard for liability under Vaca, see Comment, Breaching the Duty of Fair Representation:
The Union's Liability, 17 J. MAR. L. REv. 415, 422-23 (1984).
68. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1965) (predicting "a
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extending job security to unorganized employees. Such protection necessa-
rily entails abrogation of the employer's absolute property right to control
job tenure. Thus the current revaluation of employment rights inverts
Babcock's priorities; it sacrifices an employer property right to employee
job security (while preserving the employer's managerial authority to dis-
charge an employee for cause).
This reconception of employment rights rests on two premises. The first
is that, for the vast majority of Americans, jobs are the principal source of
wealth and status,69 and have replaced traditional forms of property as the
material basis of individual liberty.70 The second is that gross inequality
of bargaining power prevents unorganized employees from achieving job
security.71 These premises are most frequently advanced in the large body
of literature 2 advocating abandonment of the rule, applicable to all em-
growing demand that significant jobs be available for everyone"); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964) (expanded notions of property rights necessary to ensure employees' personal auton-
omy); Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employnent, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1973)
(without restraint on power of dismissal employers exercise dominion over employees' fundamental
liberties); see also infra notes 71-72.
69. The observation is not new. The following passage is cited repeatedly in recent articles advo-
cating abandonment of employment at will:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of
livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose
their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms of social
security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's
hands.
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis in original); see also Reich, supra
note 68, at 739 ("To the individual .... a profession, job, or right to receive income ... [is] the basis
of... status .. .and may therefore be the most meaningful and distinctive wealth he possesses.");
Comment, supra note 68, at 1084 (A worker's "job is the basis of his position in society, and, there-
fore, may be the most meaningful form of wealth he possesses.").
70.
Old conceptions of property limited to the protection of interests in land and physical objects
will no longer serve as adequate protection for the individual. Abstractions like jobs must be
protected if individual liberty is to survive. Our concept of property must be expanded to
encompass the employment relationship, to protect against wrongful discharge.
Comment, supra note 68, at 1085; see also Reich, supra note 68, at 787 (ownership of means of
subsistence is increasingly determinative of individual liberty).
71. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); Comment, supra note 68,
at 1084, 1093-94; Note, Protecting At Will Employees against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1826 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Protecting At Will Employees]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
337-38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights]. The development of this inequal-
ity led to federal protection of the right of self-organization in the NLRA and the growth of the labor
movement pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions of the Act. Blades, Employment At Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
1404, 1404-05 (1967) ("It is well known that the labor union movement was a response to the
imbalance in the relationship of the individual to his employer.").
72. See Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment At
Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, supra note 71; Estreicher, At-Will Employmnent and the
Problem of Unjust. Dismissal: The Appropriate Judicial Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 146 (1982);
Hermann & Sor, Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employnent-At-Will, 24 ARIZ.
L. REV. 763 (1982); Lansing & Pegnetter, Fair Dismissal Procedures for Non-Union Employees, 20
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ployees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement,7 3 that an em-
ployment contract of indefinite length is terminable at the will of either
party.74 Founded upon the principle of freedom of contract, the at-will
rule fundamentally reflects the view that "an employer has a property
right of choice concerning whom to employ, for how long, and under what
conditions."7' 5 The rule reached its height in pre-NLRA Supreme Court
decisions granting it the status of a constitutionally protected property
right.
7 6
Contemporary critics of employment at will argue that the assumption
of contractual freedom upon which the rule is premised has been rendered
obsolete by the declining mobility of the workforce, heightened job insecu-
rity, and increased employee inequality in bargaining power.77 They pro-
pose to afford jobs the protection of a property right through statutory 8 or
AM. Bus. L.J. 75 (1982); Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329 (1982); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Emnplo.)nent: A Necessary Change
in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termnination At Will: A
Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to Termi-
nate At-Will Employees, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 633 (1982); Summers, supra note 7; Comment, supra
note 68; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 71; Note, Protecting Employees At Will
against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note,
Implied Contract Rights, supra note 71.
73. According to current figures, the proportion of unionized workers in the non-agricultural la-
bor force is just over twenty percent. Weiler, supra note 49, at 1771-72. Thus the large majority of
the American workforce is subject to the employment at will doctrine.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958); 9 S. WILLISTON & W. JAEGER, WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129 & n.11 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1980). The rule is usually traced
to the nineteenth century treatise, H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). The at-
will rule, which permits the employer "to discharge an employee for good cause, for no cause or even
for a bad cause unless the employer relinquished this right by an agreement providing for a definite
period of employment," Murg & Scharman, supra note 72, at 335, is a product of the transformation
of the law of employment relations, in the late nineteenth century, from the principally status-oriented
master-servant doctrine to the contractual principles of laissez-faire economics. Hermann & Sor,
supra note 72, at 770; M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 147-49 (1981).
Adopted in a period of rapid industrial expansion in both America, see Lansing & Pegnetter, supra
note 72, at 77, and Europe, M. GLENDON, supra, at 148, employment at will provided flexibility to
entrepreneurs by allowing them to impose the risks of economic transformation on the employee.
Murg & Scharman, supra note 72, at 335-36.
75. Estreicher, supra note 72, at 147 (emphasis added).
76. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down anti-yellow dog contract legislation that
prohibited discharge of employees on the basis of membership in a labor organization). See Blades,
supra note 71, at 1417; Summers, supra note 7, at 485-86.
77. Blackburn, supra note 72, at 470: "In an era of high unemployment, the interest of an em-
ployee in securing steady employment undermines any theoretical power to freely terminate the em-
ployment contract." See Estreicher, supra note 72, at 148-49; Note, Emplo)nent At Will: An Analy-
sis and Critique of the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA L. REv. 787, 791-92 (1983).
78. See Estreicher, supra note 72, at 149; Hermann & Sor, supra note 72, at 812-15; Summers,
supra note 7, at 519-32. The legislative proposals typically draw on existing European legislation,
inspired by the International Labor Organization Recommendation No. 119, Concerning TerminatioAi
of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, 2 ACTS OF THE FIFTH INT'L CONGRESS OF LA-
BOUR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1963). Summers, supra note 7, at 508-19. Of all the countries
that had adopted the at-will doctrine, only the United States has not statutorily abolished it. M.
GLENDON, supra note 74, at 151-52.
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judicial79 imposition of a "just cause" standard, prohibiting employers
from discharging unorganized employees in the absence of a legitimate
business reason. Recent legislative and judicial activity reflects increasing
sympathy for this proposal.
Federal and state legislation has progressively limited the actual scope
of the employer's power under the at-will rule. The first important such
statute, the NLRA, prohibits discharge motivated by an employee's union
activity.80 In declaring the statute constitutional, the Court revoked the at-
will rule's status as a constitutionally protected property right of the em-
ployer.81 Later federal and state statutes have extended the prohibition
against discharge to other motives unrelated to the employer's managerial
needs.82
Courts are also moving away from a pure at-will regime. Employment
at will is a judicial doctrine; while some state courts have declined to rec-
ognize exceptions to such a well-settled rule in the absence of a legislative
mandate,"3 most that have considered the issue in recent years have either
granted relief based on an exception to the at-will rule or indicated a
willingness to recognize exceptions in future cases.84
79. Blackburn, supra note 72, at 482-92; Blades, supra note 71, at 1421-35; Protecting At Will
Employees, supra note 71, at 1836-44; Note, supra note 72, at 1951; Note, Implied Contract Rights,
supra note 71, at 366-69.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
81. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding NLRA's provision
forbidding discharge motivated by employee's union activity).
82. The most important of these, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, and sex, and has been used to challenge dismissals in a wide variety of cases, as have the
similar state statutes and local ordinances that extend Title VI's protection to virtually all public and
private employees. Summers, supra note 7, at 493. At the federal level, Title VII is supplemented by
legislation prohibiting discharges based on age, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§
1-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982), and by several more specialized provisions. These provisions
include protection of employees against dismissals resulting from the garnishment of wages for indebt-
edness, Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1982), or the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 15(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(3) (1982), and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
At the state level, in addition to the protections against employment discrimination noted above,
there are a variety of statutory limits on employers' power of discharge. At least fifteen states have
legislation similar to the NLRA. Summers, supra note 7, at 492. A number offer statutory protection
against discharge designed to coerce employee voting, id. at 495, or political activity more broadly
defined, id., or against discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim, Peirce, Mann
& Roberts, supra note 72, at 13, serving on a jury, LAB. L. REP. (State Laws) (CCH) 43,035,
refusing to take a lie detector test, id. 43,055, or reporting or participating in the investigation of a
reported violation of federal, state, or local law. Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.362 (1981).
83. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilalre Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1131-32 (Ala. 1977); Ivy v. Army
Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831, 831 (D.C. App. 1981).
84. The first major case in the development of judicial recognition of exceptions to the at-will rule
was Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189-90, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (1959).
Since Peternnann, courts in twenty-four states have recognized exceptions to the rule. See Naylor,
Employnent at Will: The Decay of an Anachronistic Shield for Employers?, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 113,
117 & n.15 (1983-1984).
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Some courts have departed radically from employment at will, authoriz-
ing causes of action with far-reaching implications for the creation of an
employee job property right. For example, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 85 the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted relief to a plaintiff
who claimed that she had been discharged for refusing to date her fore-
man; the court found the employer in breach of an implicit contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 6 Were courts to imply such a
Courts in at least three other states have indicated a willingness to recognize an exception to the at-
will rule while rejecting the claim presented in the particular case. Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines,
270 N.W.2d 454, 456-57 (Iowa 1978); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 316-17, 299
N.W.2d 147, 151-52 (1980); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 564, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979).
These courts agree on the need to place limits on the employer's power under the at-will rule; they
differ only as to how large an exception to carve out and whether to base it on tort or contract
principles. See Note, supra note 72, at 1935. In fact, as the commentators demonstrate, maximum job
security consistent with recognition of the employer's managerial needs can be achieved on either tort
or contract grounds through judicial imposition of a "just cause" standard governing dismissals. In
tort, the cause of action may proceed upon the theory that any discharge, absent just cause, violates
the public policy of ensuring stability of employment. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra
note 71, at 1833-34; Note, supra note 72, at 1950. Contractual imposition of a just cause standard
may proceed in two ways: through the implication of a contractual just cause provision based upon
legitimate employee expectations, or by holding that all employment contracts contain implied cove-
nants of good faith and fair dealing that preclude dismissal absent just cause.
The early judicial exceptions to employment at will were in tort and predicated upon employer
violation of an explicit state public policy. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172,
610 P.2d 1330, 1332-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1980) (discussing cases in which public policy
exception was created). The public policy exception has been applied in three separate categories of
cases: (1) discharges in retaliation for refusal to commit an illegal act; (2) discharges in retaliation for
exercise of a statutory right; (3) discharges in retaliation for whistle blowing activity. Bakaly, Erosion
of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 8 J. CoNTEMP. L. 63, 69-73 (1982). Other public policy cases
are predicated upon a direct harm to the employee. One line of cases recognizes an exception to the
at-will rule for employees discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. See Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-86, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-59 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 252-53, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 646-49, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153-54 (1976). See also Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894, 898-900 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing, under Pennsylvania law, cause of action based on
violation of associational freedom guaranteed by state and federal constitutions).
A growing number of cases adopt a contractual theory, typically implying a just cause for dismissal
term by incorporating into the contract statements in employer policy manuals or other representa-
tions of continuing employment made to the employee. For example, in Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald
Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978), the employee received a handbook, two days after
hire, but on the first day of work, which described grounds for termination during the initial proba-
tionary period of employment; the Oregon Supreme Court held that a jury could consider the grounds
stated in the handbook as part of the employment contract. Id. at 654-58, 576 P.2d at 358-60; see
also Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981) (personnel
policies or practices of employer sufficient to bind employer to just cause standard); Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (length of service and
personnel policy of employer); Toussalnt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292
N.W.2d 880, 891-92 (1980) (supervisory manual and oral representation of personnel policies); Wei-
ner v. McGraw-Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460-61, 465-66 (1982) (policy manual and oral representation
of employer). While these cases predicate the cause of action on the employee's own interest in job
security, the contract approach is open to frustration through express contractual reservation of the
employer's right to discharge without cause. See Note, supra note 72, at 1935.
85. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
86. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. The Monge court also noted that limits on the employer's power
under employment at will were necessary in view of the public's interest in employment security.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also granted relief on the basis of such an
The Yale Law Journal
covenant in all employment contracts, they would effectively impose a just
cause standard for dismissal of unorganized employees.
Erosion of the at-will rule indicates that courts have reconceptualized
the employment relationship. This reconceptualization acknowledges both
employees' and the public's interest in job security, and leads to protection
of that interest through elimination of the employer's right to make arbi-
trary or discriminatory decisions regarding job tenure. Thus the New
Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned, in Monge, that: "In all employment
contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's interest in
running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
maintaining a proper balance between the two."' 87 Whether statutory or
judicial, proposals to eliminate at-will employment balance managerial
needs against job security, and permit the employer to dismiss for cause.8"
CONCLUSION
Continued recognition of the Babcock doctrine seriously and unjustifi-
ably limits the reach of an emerging balance between employees' interest
in job security and the employer's managerial prerogative. The NLRA
enables employees to protect their jobs against dismissal without cause
through self-organization. Both the burdening of union and employer
rights in administration of the Act and the recent trend towards protection
of unorganized employees against unjust dismissal display an enhanced
appreciation of the value of employment security. If this value is to be
adequately protected, courts must free the employee right of self-
organization from the constraints imposed by Babcock.
The Supreme Court should overrule Babcock, and revive the standards
articulated in Republic Aviation to regulate nonemployee solicitation.89
These standards can be flexibly applied9" to allow employees to discuss
organization at the most meaningful location, the workplace, with the
nonemployee organizers who possess information critical to the choice re-
implied covenant, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1255-56 (1977), and a recent California case holds that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
implicit in all employment contracts, Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980).
87. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
88. Hermann & Sor, supra note 72, at 815-16; Peck, supra note 72, at 48-49; Peirce, Mann &
Roberts, supra note 72, at 45; Summers, supra note 7, at 501-08; Comment, supra note 68, at
1108-09; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 71, at 1840; Note, Implied Contract Rights,
supra note 71, at 366-69.
89. 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943)). See
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the flexible application of these
standards in the context of retail businesses.
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garding unionization. By limiting routine access of nonemployee or-
ganizers to parking lots and nonsensitive plant areas, while ensuring a
reasonable opportunity for nonemployee organizers to respond in kind to
employer captive audience speeches, these standards make meaningful
nonemployee solicitation possible without compromising the legitimate
managerial interests of employers."
-Sarah Korn
91. This approach also justifies loosening the restrictions currently imposed on employer cam-
paign activities. Nonemployee access to company property would counteract the employer's great ad-
vantage in communicating with employees during the campaign, thus legitimating an enlargement of
the sphere of employer campaign speech protected by the First Amendment. The converse of this
proposition was stated in UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, supra note 47, at 157:
An opportunity for unions to respond on company premises to anti-union campaigning on
those premises is particularly important if the Board, as we recommend, is to cease regulating
speech. Campaign regulation in political elections is based on the assumption that each party
will be able to point out to the voters those aspects of the other party's campaign it believes to
be untruthful or unfair. Unions will have that ability only if they have the opportunity to
campaign on equal terms with the employer on company premises.
